

The ETHIC Stack: The Neglected Mechanisms of Moral Decision-Making

A multi-level, mechanistic framework for ethical competence in warfighting

Dorian Minors

Abstract

Ethical decision-making has been, and remains, a critical feature of modern warfighting. This is not simply because it is a humanistic imperative, but because it is a combat-power multiplier. Yet two chronic defects plague most doctrinal and Professional Military Education (PME) approaches to the subject. The first is an overemphasis on “reason”—deliberative, or evaluative processes of decision-making. These processes appear to rationalise convenient beliefs more often than challenge or adjust them, and thus, relying on them alone to improve ethical decision-making is unwise. The second is related: ethical decision-making approaches typically remain prescriptive rather than mechanistic—they tell us what to do, but not how to do it. This seems logical when ‘reason’ is seen as a primary solution to ethical problems, but as ‘reason’ is flawed, so too is prescription. To address these issues, I demonstrate the value of a mechanistic approach to ethical decision-making. I sketch a tentative five-layer mechanism of moral action that illustrates the causal plumbing required to intervene on and thus improve ethical judgement. Specifically, I suggest what happens at the neural ([E]arly emotional), cognitive ([T]hought-level schemas), situational ([H]abitat), relational ([I]n-group dynamics), and cultural ([C]ultural and institutional scaffolding) levels, that inform moral behaviour. Hence, the ETHIC Stack, a multi-level, mechanistic framework for ethical competence in warfighting, which serves as an illustration for improving doctrinal and PME on the subject.

Contents

1	Introduction	3
2	Deliberation may be more slave than master	5
2.1	We prefer deliberation over intuition	5
2.2	Moral judgements are particularly vulnerable to intuition	7
2.3	Moral deliberation is particularly compromised under stress	8
3	Prescription fails under fire	9
3.1	Prescription does not tell you <i>how</i>	9
3.2	Prescription cannot resolve value conflicts	10
3.3	Prescriptive ingredients do not make a meal	11
4	The ETHIC Stack: a multi-level mechanistic framework	12
4.1	Early, emotional circuitry	15
4.1.1	Worked example: Pattern violations as valence generators . . .	15
4.1.2	Intervention handles	17
4.2	Thought-level schemas	18
4.2.1	Worked example: The “lazy controller”	19
4.2.2	Intervention handles	20
4.3	Habitat, or immediate situation	22
4.3.1	Worked example: Affordance competition	23
4.3.2	Intervention handles	25
4.4	In-group and social dynamics	26
4.4.1	Worked example: Engaged followership	26
4.4.2	Intervention handles	27
4.5	Cultural and institutional scaffolding	29
4.5.1	Worked example: Tight-loose cultural constraint	30
4.5.2	Intervention handles	31
5	Conclusion	34
5.1	Augmenting existing decision-aides	35
5.2	Sharpening recent PME trends	36
5.3	Obvious vulnerabilities, limitations, and opportunities for refinement .	37
5.4	Final word	40
6	Appendix A: Alternative Candidates for Mechanistic Accounts	41
6.0.1	Early, affective circuitry	41
6.0.2	Thought level schemas	43
6.0.3	Habitat, or situational factors	47
6.0.4	In-group and social dynamics	49
6.0.5	Cultural and institutional scaffolding	51
	References	54

1 Introduction

A note of special thanks to Major Benjamin Ordiway, whose Moral Terrain project inspired this article, and several of its features.

<Vignette about Montgomery, Intake 1 at Sandhurst on ethical leadership>.

Ethical decision-making has been, and remains, a critical feature of modern warfighting. This is not simply because it is a humanistic imperative, but because it is a combat-power multiplier. Specifically, judgements involving moral content made “in the moment” do not just decide tactical success, they also determine post-conflict legitimacy. This is why the “moral component” of fighting power is judged “arguably the most important” in British leadership doctrine, because “success on operations is dependent upon people to a greater degree than equipment or tactics” (Centre for Army Leadership (CAL), 2021, p. 11). The perspective is not restricted to the British, of course. Ethical leadership “is the single most important factor in ensuring the legitimacy of [Australian] operations and the support of the Australian people” in Australian leadership doctrine (Lessons and Doctrine Directorate ADF, 2021, p. 7) for example, and reflections from our U.S. partners value “the [U.S.] Army Ethic” as their “greatest asset, even when compared to the technology and weaponry of the modern operating environment”, critical to both the morale of soldiers and trust of the U.S. populace (Crayne, 2025, p. 6). It is no surprise, therefore, that models of ethical decision-making proliferate among military establishments.

Sadly, two understandable, but chronic defects plague most doctrinal and Professional Military Education (PME) approaches to the subject that make their utility questionable.¹

The first is an overemphasis on “reason”—deliberative, or evaluative processes of decision-making. As Section 2 of this article explores in more detail, deliberative thought appears to more frequently rationalise established intuitions, desires, and beliefs, as opposed to

¹Though, it should be noted that naturalistic and recognition-primed decision-making, and behavioural engineering is often built into e.g. NATO TTPs. I am referring more to what is made explicit.

challenge or adjust them. Troublingly, moral judgements seem particularly vulnerable to this property of human cognition. More troubling still, even when this is not the case, deliberative processes of thought are particularly at risk when stress, time-pressure, fatigue, or habituated brutality predominate—precisely those moments where deliberative ethical competence might be most valuable.

The second defect in many efforts to improve moral decision-making in the military sphere is that they typically remain prescriptive rather than mechanistic. As Section 3 details more thoroughly, telling people what they ought to do has little utility unless one also demonstrates how they might achieve it, particularly when the value of deliberative, ‘reasoned’ thought is in question. Perhaps more importantly, the “mechanistic turn” in cognitive science has been underway for at least a quarter-century. Launched ostensibly by Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s (2000) seminal work (see also Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2007; Glennan, 2017), the project is explicitly motivated by the utility of moving from descriptive to mechanistic accounts of human thought and behaviour. Yet research on military ethics has yet to absorb these insights in earnest.

I will demonstrate in both sections to demonstrate how two illustrative cases show these defects in practice: Kem’s “Ethical Triangle” (2006), dominant in the U.S., and Sandhurst’s own S-CALM model (Vincent, 2022). Each are elegant blueprints for ethical decision-making in the military context that are, nevertheless, limited thus.

I then will go on, in Section 4 of this article, to sketch in rough the kind of framework I suspect would remedy these defects. Grounded in concepts drawn from the mechanistic turn in cognitive and social sciences, I will propose a multi-level approach to ethical competence that both accounts for the more inconvenient properties of human decision-making and lays the kind of causal plumbing required to intervene on and improve ethical judgement. This framework is not designed to be comprehensive, but rather, to be a pedagogical tool which serves to demonstrate the kind of thing that would advance ethical education in the military environment.

To conclude, I will illustrate how: such a framework neatly accommodates and augments existing models of ethical decision-making; supports and sharpens recent innovations

in PME recommendations around ethical education; and lends itself to—and in fact, necessitates—the adaptation of these things for cultural variation in norms and values; before highlighting those areas where this rough framework is weak and requires improvement. In particular, I desire to make clear that, in the language of the “New Mechanists”, this sketch is a “how-possibly” explanation of moral behaviour, not a “how-actually” one, laying groundwork for development into something less possible, and more plausible.

2 Deliberation may be more slave than master

There is a tension in the way in which we grapple with the role of deliberative thought in shaping human behaviour. On the one hand, deliberative thought is frequently interpreted to be the necessary master of our more emotional intuitions. Epictetus paired emotionally coloured impressions (*phantasia*) with our power to rationally decide whether those impressions were true and thus to act on them (*prohairesis*) in *Discourses*. Aquinas paired the *appetitus sensitivus*, the sense appetite, with the *appetitus rationalis*, the rational appetite in *Summa Theologiae*. Kant laid out his Categorical Imperative in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Kahneman posed his ‘fast’ cognitive System 1 against his ‘slow’ cognitive System 2 in *Thinking Fast and Slow*.

On the other hand, there is the uncomfortable understanding that, at least sometimes, deliberative thought is a slave to these very same emotional intuitions. Aristotle noted in *Nicomachean Ethics* that when appetite wins over reason, we will counterfeit syllogisms to excuse the victory of passion. Hume, in the *Treatise of Human Nature*, pointed out that reason is the slave of the passions. Nietzsche in *Genealogy of Morality* illustrated that arguments are masks which our drives deploy after the fact. Damasio in *Descartes’ Error* suggested that emotion provides the necessary signals which guide ‘rational’ choices.

2.1 We prefer deliberation over intuition

The stronger impulse appears to be to optimistically defer to deliberation as master. Perhaps Mercier and Sperberger (2017) overstate the case, but they are certainly not wrong

when they write in their introduction:

Psychologists generally recognize that reason is biased and lazy, that it often fails to correct mistaken intuitions, and that it sometimes makes things worse. Yet most of them also maintain that the main function of reason is to enhance individual cognition

This is a major project of behavioural economics, for example (Kahneman, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009; though c.f. Maier et al., 2022), and remains a foundational premise of modern cognitive-behavioural therapeutic approaches (i.e. Beck, 1979; Ellis, 1962; see Hofmann et al., 2012). Mercier and Sperberger themselves centre their argument around the fact that reasoning in groups is quite reliable, in an effort to rescue the process.

Military ethicists similarly appear, on average, to favour deliberative processes of thought as a means of navigating moral terrain (though c.f. Messervey et al., 2021; Ordiway, 2022). For example, Kem's (2006) "Ethical Triangle Decision-Making model" has been described as "perhaps the most recognizable tool for ethical decision-making in the military" (Ordiway, 2022). In it, Kem suggests that the decision-maker's "courses of action should be tested against three completely different criteria for ethical decision making. They are: principles or the rules-based approach; consequences or the utilitarian approach; and virtues. These are the three basic schools of thought for ethics" (p. 27).² Nowhere does Kem engage with the fact that both his model, and the model upon which his work is based, will be subject to the inherent dangers in relying on such deliberative 'testing' in cases where deliberation is the slave of intuition.

We might also illustrate with an ethical decision-making model developed at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst: Vincent's (2022) S-CALM model. As is perhaps appropriate for a model developed 16 years later than Kem's, Vincent more explicitly engages with the role of both deliberative and intuitive decision-making in moral judgement. The core premise of the model is that chains of unethical behaviour are dominated by intu-

²Here, Kem is referring to deontological ethics, a combination of consequentialist and utilitarian ethics, and virtue ethics respectively, for those who wish to explore them further. Contra Kem's claim that these are the 'basic' schools of thought, there are in fact many more. One might also consider, for example, care ethics, communitarian and role ethics, moral particularism, and pragmatic ethics as a start.

itive, fast thought processes (p. 18). Vincent identifies thirteen of these, and highlights five situational factors that appear to influence them. He explicitly recommends that leaders should use their deliberative processes to “recognise how the [situational factors] may be driving their thought processes” (p. 32) and describes three lines of questioning to counteract unethical patterns that might ensue. Again advancing beyond Kem, Vincent goes as far as recognising that deliberative thought can also be error-prone. However, this insight only appears in a single aside in his seminal paper (p. 14).

Both models neatly illustrate the point that military ethics, like the sciences of mind, frequently rely on the promise of deliberative processes of thought to enhance decision-making. This seems entirely appropriate. Deliberative, conscious processing *does* adjust moral judgement (e.g. Cushman et al., 2006; Greene, 2014a; Musschenga, 2008) Unlike the sciences of mind, however, there is little explicit consideration of the fact that, while deliberation may sometimes serve as master, it also plays a role as slave.

2.2 Moral judgements are particularly vulnerable to intuition

Sadly, the weight of evidence, particularly when it comes to *moral* judgement, appears to favour the idea of intuition as master, and reason as slave. Specifically, that deliberative processes appear to more frequently rationalise our intuitions, rather than challenge or adjust them.

The obvious starting place to illustrate this would be Haidt’s Social Intuitionist approach to moral judgement (Haidt, 2001; or Haidt, 2012 for the more casual reader). Couched in dual-process frameworks of cognition—theories which attempt to formally and empirically distinguish the kinds of deliberative and intuitive processes of thought we have been speaking of—Haidt proposes:

- (a) [t]here are two cognitive processes at work – reasoning and intuition
 - and the reasoning process has been overemphasized, (b) reasoning is often motivated, (c) the reasoning process constructs *post hoc* justifications, yet we experience the illusion of objective reasoning; and

(d) moral action covaries with moral emotion more than with moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001, p. 815).

Not everyone agrees with Haidt's damning interpretation of the moral failings of 'reason' (e.g. Brand, 2016; Greene, 2014b; Karssing, 2023; Musschenga, 2008), but his project has been taken very seriously by some military ethicists (see Karssing, 2023; Messervey et al., 2021; Ordiway, 2022 for good, compact overviews).

2.3 Moral deliberation is particularly compromised under stress

Military ethicists take this seriously in large part because deliberative processes of thought are particularly at risk of compromise when stress, time-pressure, fatigue, or habituated brutality predominate—precisely those moments where deliberative ethical competence might be most valuable (e.g. Messervey et al., 2023; Schwabe & Wolf, 2011; Shields et al., 2016; Starcke & Brand, 2012).

More problematically still, this dual-process theory of mind in which 'intuition' vies with 'deliberation' leaves increasingly uncomfortable explanatory gaps. Models which find it necessary to distinguish deliberation and intuition from a third algorithmic or rule-following process aren't uncommon (e.g. Sauer, 2019; Stanovich, 2009). Other authors ignore the distinction entirely, making the case that reason is just one of any number of processes involved in decision-making (e.g. Brand, 2016). Indeed, some single out the fact that, on this multi-process account, it makes more sense to interpret the role of deliberation as a tool developed to specifically process information in accordance with an initial belief, rather than challenging or adjusting those beliefs (e.g. Mercier & Sperber, 2017; see also Oeberst & Imhoff, 2023).

The upshot is that there is no particular reason to remain sanguine about the dominance of deliberation over more automatic and emotional intuitions. At best deliberation serves a dual role as master and slave. More likely, it is merely one of many competing cognitive processes. At worst, it is more slave than master.

3 Prescription fails under fire

A quarter-century ago, Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) launched a movement in philosophy of science when they made a seemingly common-sense observation: any model that hopes to account for reliable changes in the world must identify those things that actually produce the phenomenon of interest. Bechtel (2007), Craver (2007), and Glennon (2017), among others, later extended the idea into the cognitive, neural, and social sciences: explanations that permit manipulation of the mind, brain, or people are those which explain *how* those things can be manipulated.

I would be surprised to find that the average reader disagreed with this conclusion, even without brushing up on mechanistic philosophy. Yet, it would not be controversial to say that the vast majority of military guides to ethical behaviour take the form of check-lists, flow-charts, or maxims. These documents declare *what* a soldier should do without spelling out *how* they might actually go about achieving the prescribed course of action. Indeed, in keeping with the deliberative optimism described in Section 2, much Professional Military Education (PME) still treats ethics as a collection of external rules to be consulted, rather than a system upon which one can intervene.

3.1 Prescription does not tell you *how*

This kind of prescription without mechanism—a causal chain linking stimulus to perception, appraisal, action, and feedback—runs the risk of disguising our inability to intervene on the causes of unethical behaviour. The *feeling* of understanding is under no obligation to reflect *actual* understanding (Davis, 1971; Trout, 2002; Wilson & Keil, 1998). In this particular case, normative prescriptions (rules) paired with procedural directives (check lists) *appear* to indicate a solution—you know what you *should* do, and what things *can* be done—but this approach is under no obligation to bear fruit.

A brief tour of recent military scandals makes the problem concrete. Participants in the events at U.S. run Abu Ghraib prison, our own “Helmand Province Killing”, or the

Canadian “Somalia Affair”³ were not ignorant of the Law of Armed Conflict; soldiers had been briefed, and laminated cards spelling out the rules were literally clipped to flak jackets. Yet, knowledge of rules did not translate into procedural action because the prescriptions never penetrated the causal chain that links occasion to perception, through thought, and onward into behaviour. In a 2014 conference held at Sandhurst, the “consensus was that while [British Army Values and Standards] in combination with [the Law of Armed Conflict] was absolutely essential, they are not sufficient in equipping officers and soldiers with the necessary ‘tool box’ with which to deal with ‘real world’ ethical problems in complex operational environments” (Deakin, 2014; in Vincent, 2022).

3.2 Prescription cannot resolve value conflicts

If we return to the two ethical decision-making models we used to illustrate Section 2, we see that they each emphasise the failings of prescriptive ethical logic. To start, recall Kem’s “Ethical Triangle” (2006): a decision-maker should test a course of action against “three basic schools of thought for ethics”— (p. 27). For the first—rules-based ethics—Kem suggests one ask the questions “what rules exist” and “what are my moral obligations?” (p. 29). For the second—consequence-oriented ethics—Kem suggests one ask “what gives the biggest bang for the buck” and “who wins and loses?” For the final school—virtue-oriented ethics—Kem suggests one ask “what would my mom think?” or “what if my actions showed up on the front page of the newspaper?” (p. 32) Then, the individual should go on to select the course of action “that best represents Army values” (p. 33).

Initially, Kem’s prescriptions seem, and are in many cases, quite helpful. It is an eminently memorable triage tool. However, we only have to look at Kem’s own motivation to identify a difficulty in application. Kem explicitly highlights Kidder’s (1995) observation that ethical values frequently come into conflict as the kind of ambiguity the Kem’s Triangle

³For the unfamiliar reader, I will briefly describe these cases by matching in tone their Wikipedia entries for ease of internet search, though one could easily replace them with other examples. Abu Ghraib refers to a series of human rights violations and war crimes against detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison during the Iraq war. The “Helmand Province Killing” refers to the 2011 manslaughter of a wounded Taliban insurgent by Alexander Blackman. The “Somalia Affair” refers to the 1993 beating of Shidane Arone, a Somali teenager, to death by two Canadian peacekeepers.

should resolve. Kidder noted that humans often face a choice between justice and mercy, for example, or between truth and loyalty. Kem suggests that we define ethical problems in such terms in order to test them “against ethical standards” (p. 26). Yet, the moment Kem’s lenses disagree, as they predictably will, the model falls silent. If “what rules exist” conflict with “what my mom might think” the Triangle provides no means to weight principles against virtues or consequences. It provides no cues for escaping the kinds of motivated reasoning described earlier. It recommends no training protocol for cultivating the requisite judgement under operational stress. We’ve simply reconstituted Kem’s concern with different labels.

3.3 Prescriptive ingredients do not make a meal

Vincent’s (2022) S-CALM framework makes great strides towards mechanism. Vincent takes pains to detail five situational factors and thirteen common, literature-derived behaviours that appear to be particularly associated with unethical behaviour. Yet, once these elements are laid out, and some levers for change highlighted, he reverts to prescription: leaders must “recognise” and “mitigate” these things, “apply their leadership skills”, “use their moral compass” (p. 32) and measure decisions against the “useful check list” of the British Army Standards (p. 29). In other words, much of the causal plumbing remains unspecified. In particular, Vincent leaves unspecified the conditions under which situational factors interact with common behaviours to produce unethical behaviour, and thus when and how a leader might intervene. More, “mitigation” is portrayed as an almost undifferentiated act of ethical leadership, but the eighteen (five plus thirteen) risk factors are hardly interchangeable. Vincent details their differences well, and does illuminate some mechanistic handles, but his project does not reliably map risk factors to their corresponding corrective. Essentially, Vincent catalogues ingredients of ethical failure, but does not quite wire them together into a manipulable system.

Prescription without interconnection is not enough. A genuinely mechanistic account must specify not merely the ingredients—be they rules, virtues, situational factors, biases—but also the ways in which those ingredients interact to generate ethical or un-

ethical action. In Section 4 I sketch such an account. Drawing on the “New Mechanist” idea that explanations hinge on entities (parts) and the activities that connect them, I propose a multi-level framework in the vein of Glennan (2017) that (1) identifies the causal stages in moral behaviour, (2) locates intervention points along that chain, and (3) offers practical levers for commanders who must make moral judgements in real time, or under complex circumstance.

4 The ETHIC Stack: a multi-level mechanistic framework

Now we must turn our attention from the easy thing—criticising other peoples’ valiant attempts to tackle the problem of ethical decision-making—and do something to resolve the fissures we have exposed. Here I will attempt to describe a provisional causal story that wires together both the ingredients and those ways in which the ingredients interact to produce moral action. In the effort, I wish to be clear at the outset that my aim is simply to sketch the kind of thing I have in mind rather than attend to every philosophical and empirical nuance. I simply hope to provide a starting point for those interested in the *mechanisms* of moral behaviour.

We should start by describing in detail what the New Mechanists would consider a mechanism (Machamer et al., 2000)—in my moral mechanism, I must attend to:

1. the mechanism’s “entities”: the (relatively) stable ingredients, or parts of the system;
2. it’s “activities”: the *things* that those parts engage in; and
3. the organisation: the way those things are linked together.

Usefully, one can illustrate these features using any kind of well understood contraption. So in the handheld radio sets any Officer should be familiar with, the antenna is an entity that captures the radiowave (activity). The tuner (entity) filters the wave to a specific frequency (activity). The heterodyning circuit (entity) drops that frequency into the

audible range (activity). The amplifier (entity) boosts the signal (activity). The speaker (entity) converts it to sound (activity). The overarching organisation for this mechanism is clear: radiowaves are transformed into audible, intelligible sound.

The explanatory value of this organised schematic is that it shows precisely where one can “wiggle” something to change the outcome of the process. For example, as the soldier who has had the reckless audacity to patrol into the hills has discovered, swapping her now useless short antenna for a longer one will help capture the lost radiowaves more effectively. Woodward (2005) calls this the “Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation” (p. 9), and it is precisely the attribute missing from accounts of ethical behaviour I complained about in the previous section.

In what follows, I will outline a tentative five-layer mechanism of moral action that explicitly follows this parts-and-activities template, and illustrate how each layer cascades into the others. The levels are selected for when the dominant manipulable organisations shift from one domain to another—neural, cognitive, situational, relational, and cultural. However, it will be obvious to the reader that the boundaries between levels are not nearly so neat as this paper will imply, and they should be encouraged to isolate levels in different places than my own if it suit them.

In the game tradition of military acronymic zeal, I will call it *the ETHIC Stack*,⁴ though this is more for fun than anything else and might actually make it less comprehensible:

- E: the early, emotional circuitry;
- T: the thought patterns and cognitive-social schemas;
- H: the immediate habitat (really, the situation);
- I: the in-group and social dynamics;
- C: the cultural, command, and institutional scaffolding.

At each level, I will sketch a specific mechanism at that level, drawing on an exploratory account of relevant candidate theories from the literature. I will demonstrate how doing so permits intervention—how the mechanism implies we might “wiggle” things to

⁴We must thank, or blame, AI for this. I can take no credit.

achieve ethical behaviour. I will then outline what is left to explain, and point the reader to viable alternative mechanisms to explore at their leisure.

In this way, though the model is exploratory—a “how-possibly”, and sometimes “how-plausibly”, but not yet “how-actually” blueprint—it is nevertheless mechanistic enough to guide both empirical development and practical training in ethical competence in the military context. More to the point, my hope is that it demonstrates very clearly the difference between prescription (what *can* be done) from mechanism (*how* it can be done), as well as where even the most naive reader might get a toehold.

Mechanisms—a primer

Entities are the relatively stable parts of a system (e.g., neural circuits, thought schemas, group norms).

Activities are what those parts do (e.g., tag situations with affect, appraise situations, sanction people).

Organisation is how parts and activities are linked to produce outcomes.

Mechanistic explanations earn their keep by manipulability: if you can point to where you can “wobble” the system to change outcomes, you have explained something useful (Machamer et al., 2000; Woodward, 2005).

The ETHIC Stack is an attempt to show why this approach is useful. It describes:

- **[E]arly, emotional:** rapid pattern-matching and affective tagging that biases action-readiness and how to intervene on it.
- **[T]hought-level schemas:** appraisal and control processes that licence, edit, or pass through intuitions and how to improve them.
- **[H]abitat (the situation):** the local decision environment that multiplies or dampens the other levels and what to consider to influence them.
- **[I]n-group dynamics:** identity, norms, and prestige feedback that steer compliance and justification and how to leverage them.
- **[C]ultural scaffolding:** institutional priors, narratives, and sanctions that in-

ject normative content and how they can be used to magnify behaviour.

4.1 Early, emotional circuitry

We'll start where many, though not all, military ethicists do not—by describing the most basal, “intuitive” contributions to the mechanism.

In Section 6.0.1, I review literature that speaks to the formation of moral intuitions. Of course, to include all that here would make the article even more unwieldy than it already is. Instead, I will illustrate with a single example, before summarising what is left to be explained at this level for the reader to explore further.

4.1.1 Worked example: Pattern violations as valence generators

Here, I will sketch some basic features of one plausible organisation in particular, and how doing so permits a commander to *manipulate* the thing.

An abrupt interruption to your expectations⁵ (in the sense of Mandler, 1980)—say, a door slamming—is going to be noticed by the network in the brain tuned to important stimuli—the salience network (Seeley, 2019)—within roughly a tenth of a second. Almost immediately, your overlapping affective networks (Dalglish, 2004) would tag the interruption with a valence (e.g. LeDoux, 2012)—avoid (threat/disgust) perhaps, or approach (care/protect)—based on your past experiences.⁶ This would kick off an autonomic surge of arousal that reflects the scale of the interruption and is amplified by any stress already in the system (Kandel et al., 2013). This might be generated by a stressful situation for example (H-level) or peer pressure (I-level) perhaps. This autonomic arousal, and the pressures driving it, would influence a dorsal-striatal queue of possible, very basic,

⁵The notable deviation from my example would be Feldman Barrett's (2014) observation that not all emotion follows an “interruption”. Indeed, low-level activation of this system will happen when you're simply *anticipating* an interruption of some kind (Barrett & Russell, 2014). For example, a patrol in an eerily empty courtyard, in an otherwise bustling sector, will see their affective system activate at a low-level, generating an *avoid* valence—something isn't quite right. Similarly, a familiar sign over one doorway over another will activate an *approach* valence, making the patrol more likely to exit the strange courtyard that way than some other way. Each of these act as small predictive signals that something good or bad *might* be about to happen.

⁶And possibly your uncertainty.

motor responses (e.g. Lang, 1995). On this account, whichever collection of instinctive or otherwise over-learned responses are associated with the valence would be selected for execution, and of those, the arousal would determine which one was issued—whatever could be “purchased” with the arousal. Concurrently, the valence would be passed on to the next level of the ETHIC stack (the T-level), to be processed into more complex action.




Figure 1: Our ‘pattern detector’ stands in for everything in your nervous system tuned to processing input. One fundamental job of the nervous system is to detect patterns in that input, and assign a very basic *valence*: a sense of goodness or badness. Either way, it also injects a bit of arousal to initiate urges to approach, if it’s good, or avoid, if it’s bad. You might get some instinctive behaviour for free at this point, like dodging out of the way of something fast moving towards you, but mostly this “intuition” gets passed onwards for more complex cognition. This is true of all intuitions, including *moral* cognitions.

4.1.2 Intervention handles

Now we can consider what opportunities exist for *wiggling* our mechanism before such early, affective biases cascade upwards into more complex processing.

Given the speed at which this system works, we're unlikely to be able to intervene on the *valence* at this level of the ETHIC Stack. However, it's also clear that arousal is a critical feature of what follows from the valence—if the body is unable to “buy” the action-plan, it cannot execute it. Similarly, if an action plan is already underway (‘finger on trigger’), reducing the arousal until the plan is too costly will slow it down or stop it.

Structured breathing (e.g. “box-breathing”) is well-known to reduce physiological arousal (e.g. Balban et al., 2023). Stress-inoculation drills that rehearse breathing like this under stressful circumstances make it likely to be one of the first “purchased” scripts. Engaging in the breathing will then lower the overall “neural cash” to buy more instinctive action-plans, and thus buy cognitive time for a more calculated appraisal at a higher level (e.g. the next “T”-level) of the mechanism.

Alternatively, pre-situational “implementation intention” (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) scripts might work as counter-programs to help override those routinised behaviours the hot affective tags our mechanism would otherwise produce. Spending time mentally rehearsing “actions on” when you detect low-level *anticipatory* activation of the system might act as a kind of early “investment” in certain action plans over others that will make them “cheaper” when an event actually occurs.

Of course, all this is merely a sketch. If these seem untenable, we may simply refer to Section 6.0.1 to find more palatable theory to mechanise. Equally, we could simply look to any of the other four layers, and consider how they might mechanistically influence this one.

Mechanism summary: [E]arly, emotional

The literature review for this level at Section 6.0.1 highlights that this basic pattern-recognition, affective valuation, and automatic responding process follows a similar

template, despite the varied approach to characterising its neural and theoretical substrate:

Entities: the visceral and affective valuation systems of the nervous system, and the pattern recognition machinery that informs them.

Activities: the rapid pattern-matching, as well as the arousal and affective tagging produced by those patterns which form our intuitions, both alongside the learning processes that fix and alter our basic stimulus-response pathways.

Organisation: expectations and their violations generate valence and arousal, which determines which basic action routines those valuations might activate. This output (valence + arousal) is then passed on to the T-level.

Intervention handles: arousal control (structured breathing; stress inoculation); the construction of implementation intentions; habit shaping of first actions-on; and less easily, the experiences which form our expectations.

Importantly, these mechanistic pieces should be tuned specifically to *norm*-violations to explain moral behaviour and not simply *all* affective behaviour.

Key touchpoints: Mandler (1980); Seeley (2019); Barrett & Russell (2014); LeDoux (2012); Lang (1995); Gollwitzer & Sheeran (2006). *See Section 6.0.1 on Early circuitry.*

4.2 Thought-level schemas

Having addressed the nervous system's initial response, we must then turn to the cognitive and social machinery that receives the output and interprets it. At this level of the mechanism, a great many candidate entities and activities present themselves. Indeed, much of social psychology is concerned with the development of patterns of thought. It is not immediately obvious to me which have the best claim to a mechanism of moral judgement, so I will simply select, from the overview in Section 6.0.2, those that are most convenient for the purpose of this sketch.

4.2.1 Worked example: The “lazy controller”

For the purpose of a sketch, we will choose an aspect of deliberative processing that is well described in modern cognitive brain science. The decision to “think”, in the context of the brain, is known as *controlled processing*. Where two cognitions conflict or must otherwise be managed, some higher-order process must step in to arbitrate, otherwise you will typically do things quite automatically. You can text without thinking very much, and you can drive a familiar route without thinking very much, but you cannot do both at the same time. Some *controlled* process must choose which of the two things you will do at any given moment, with particularly troubling outcomes for driving.

Similarly, moral intuitions developed at the E-level will typically influence more complex behaviour automatically. However, when multiple moral concerns (care, fairness, loyalty, etc) are activated at once (e.g. Haidt, 2012; Kidder, 1995), some controlled process must intervene to decide which will “win”. Thus, moral conflict, or confusion, will be detected by our conflict-monitoring network (Botvinick et al., 2004), which will signal the extent of the conflict⁷ to the executive network [e.g. MD/FPN; Duncan (2010); Fedorenko et al. (2013)]. Expected-Value of Control (EVC) theory (Shenhav et al., 2013) states that our executive network will then engage in controlled processing only to the extent that the expected benefit exceeds the cost of doing so. So, it will compare control policies for their costs and benefits, and deploy the one that has the best pay-off. To make things tangible, we can consider just two control policies—moral engagement and moral disengagement. Both require “controlling” the initial intuition, but one is a set of cognitive manoeuvres that sustain and engage with moral standards (moral engagement) and the other is a set that reframes the situation to bypass moral standards (moral disengagement) (Bandura, 2011). These would each be moderated by self-efficacy—how confident one is in their ability to morally engage, or disengage, to come to a “justified” conclusion (Frömer et al., 2021).

The result would be that, either the cost of engaging or disengaging is too high, and the initial moral intuition is selected to guide behaviour, or else this lazy controller of ours

⁷We might use the cognitive dissonance ratio of Harmon-Jones and Mills (2019).

would decide either to engage with, or disengage with the moral content in order to guide behaviour. Importantly, as Mercier & Sperber (2017) point out, the result of any deliberation tends to be what is *convenient* to justify more frequently than what is “most ethical”. The reason for this, according to EVC theory, is because *controlled* processing is a costly resource. We want to deliberate for as short a time as possible to allow thought to become action.




Figure 2: By default, intuitions formed at the E-level will pass directly into behaviour (far right). Sometimes, we will experience a little bit of conflict, but not enough to make us do anything but ignore it (middle). The only time our faculties of thinking really come online is when there is a *lot* of conflict (left). You can see why: look how much mental infrastructure thinking takes. It’s very costly. In this case I have simplified it for moral decision-making. Our ‘conflict monitor’ tells us how much conflict there is, and passes it to the ‘executive network’: our ‘lazy controller’. The executive network is going to solve the conflict by asking three questions: ‘can I do anything about this’, ‘how much will my thinking about this help’, and ‘what are the costs of thinking about this?’ When it comes to moral conflict, we’re speaking about whether the person feels confident to engage in the moral conflict, has experiences being successful navigating moral conflict, and doesn’t find considering ethical content very difficult. If so, then they’re more likely to engage with the moral content of the decision, rather than disengaging and passing it off.

4.2.2 Intervention handles

How might one then *wiggle* this? The architecture is not intuitive. We almost want to avoid activating controlled processing, for fear of our lazy controller selecting moral *disengagement* as a control signal and helping justifying unethical decisions. It would seem to imply, rather, that we must thicken our moral intuitions—rehearse resolving value conflicts for example, or otherwise engage in moral case deliberation—such that

our intuitions are more successful at producing ethical action and obviating the need for control.

That said, the same process will also likely help sensitise us to moral content, making moral conflict more likely, and thus making it more likely that we will activate our mechanism. Engaging in this kind of rehearsal will also boost self-efficacy beliefs in the ability to engage with moral content, making it more likely that moral engagement is the chosen control policy, over moral disengagement or simply carrying on with the initial intuition.

We might also go further, and try to de-weaponise moral disengagement, to make it less likely that it will bring relief to moral conflicts. This I discuss more in Section 6.0.2, but Bandura (2011) identifies eight moral disengagement manoeuvres, and each presents opportunities for de-fanging, and thus reducing the benefit it might bring to reducing moral conflict.

In simpler terms, we might observe, as Mercier and Sperber (2017, introduction) did:

When the reasoner starts with a strong opinion, the reasons that come to her mind tend all to support this opinion. She is unlikely, then, to change her mind ...But sometimes a reasoner starts with no strong opinion, or with conflicting views. In this case, reason will drive her toward whatever choice happens to be easier to justify

Thus, we must make the *right* decision the easier to justify, and shake loose the foundation of strong opinion.⁸

Mechanism summary: [T]hought-level schemas

The literature review for this level at Section 6.0.2 highlights that we appear to have broad *classes* of entity at this level, each with distinct collections of activities. This mechanism does a reasonable job at illustrating each:

Entities: value-categorising schemas (e.g., foundations/duties); conflict monitor

⁸One wonders if this is an underexplored reason why moral humility (which one could read as moral confusion) is so effective at improving ethical outcomes

(ACC) and executive control networks (MD/FPN); value-editing mechanisms (e.g., moral disengagement); self-efficacy beliefs.

Activities: appraising and binding gut feelings to moral content; detecting moral conflict; computing expected value of control; selecting policies (morally engage, disengage, or pass-through); generating justifications.

Organisation: a lazy controller gates intuitions; when the control threshold is exceeded, the system selects the least-cost, easiest-to-justify policy; self-efficacy biases towards engagement or disengagement.

Intervention handles: dilemma rehearsal/case deliberation; de-fang disengagement (counter-scripts); prime exemplars; prompts that raise moral salience without overload.

This level is the richest for alternative approaches, considerations, and inter-relationships with other levels of stack however.^a

Key touchpoints: Haidt (2012); Botvinick et al. (2004); Shenhav et al. (2013); Bandura (2011); Wilson & Schooler (2008); Reynolds (2008). *See Section 6.0.2 on Thought-level schemas.*

^aImportantly, the implication of the appraisal theories in particular is that processes of connecting moral intuitions to moral content is often completely automatic, and in fact might be *harm*ed by our thoughtful interference (see esp. Wilson & Schooler, 2008). As such, it would not seem ill-posed to collapse value-categorisation into the more automatic E-level (as dual-process models do), or else treat it as its own distinct level of processing.

4.3 Habitat, or immediate situation

Truly, a distractingly-named level, but for the mnemonic, we will persevere.

Situationism is a philosophical lens which notices the overwhelming empirical evidence that variance in human behaviour is usually the function of local, situational triggers, as opposed to some function of “moral character” (see Doris, 2002; Ross & Nisbett, 2011 for review). It is particularly troubling for military ethicists, as military ethics are normally virtue-based ethics—ethics that describe the kind of person one should strive to be. The

British Army Values, for example, indicate the soldier should be courageous, disciplined, respectful of others, and so on. If people are more often driven by the situation, then there is a question around how valuable virtue ethics can possibly be (Upton, 2009).

Fortunately, many aspects of humans are relatively stable. For example, personality and IQ would be rather pointless constructs if they weren't fairly stable over time and circumstance. So, we may remain sanguine that character could exist in some stable form among these kinds of psychological qualities (de Bruin et al., 2023).

What we must *not* do is underestimate the importance this level of our model holds. I have made this special note because the activities the entities at this level engage must necessarily affect *other levels*. Since the other levels of this model are merely sketched in brief, what follows may thus may seem unremarkable in context. To be clear, I suspect this level may be the most influential.

4.3.1 Worked example: Affordance competition

For a sketch, we will consider the fact that the motor-system doesn't weigh every conceivable course of action. Instead, it scans the environment for *affordances*—opportunities for action that the environment presents (Gibson, 2014). When you step onto a lurching subway carriage, the vertical poles don't just *exist* nearby—they invite you to grasp them and stabilise yourself. If the subway carriage is nice and smooth, and a seat is open nearby, you *ignore* the vertical pole, and move toward the seat instead. Two variations in the situation, two different affordances become obvious to you.

The dorsal premotor and parietal “affordance competition hypothesis” (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) specifies how the brain makes choices like these. Essentially, various action plans are tagged by a situation based on their salience (how close is the pole, how lurchy is the carriage) and utility (will grabbing the pole help, will my arms get tired holding the pole), and a kind of auction ensues (grab the pole, or go sit down instead). The selected action-plan is the one with the highest action *value*—the most salience and/or utility.




Figure 3: The environment ‘affords’ certain opportunities to act. We can imagine a kind of auction in which each of these is weighed against others to determine what you will do. For example, on a lurching subway carriage there are at least two affordances. On the left, Action 1, we have ‘grab the pole’. On the right, ‘Action 2’, we have ‘go sit down’. Now, we must assess them for how *salient* (obvious) and how much *utility* (usefulness) they have. Grabbing the pole is very salient—the pole is right there. It’s also going to stop you lurching around, so it’s useful enough. Sitting down would be better—a much less tiring way of dealing with the lurches—but the seats are *all the way over there*, so sitting down isn’t really that salient. Grabbing the pole wins. There are lots of other affordances too. You could always do a handstand, or start singing, for example. These aren’t really salient or useful at the moment though, so they sit in the background, unconsidered.

4.3.2 Intervention handles

To *wiggle* this mechanism then, we must consider these two features of the environment. How might we alter the small, often incidental details of the decision environment to reduce the salience of poor action plans, and increase the utility of good ones? To make the “affordance competition” less competitive?

Vincent’s (2022) Situational Factors and Common Behaviours provide an excellent example on how H-level influences alter [I]n-group level outcomes. A “hostile environment”, in which threat from an out-group is present, make negative forms of “othering”, like “dehumanisation” and “demonisation”, more likely by making the poor treatment of out-groups more salient. Similarly, “normalised violence” makes treating out-groups badly less troubling, and thus have greater utility (it feels less bad). “Weak leadership” makes our impulse to “conform” to tasteful behaviours less salient, and if good behaviour is inadequately recognised, it will also reduce the utility of doing so. Correcting this is a simple matter of applying situational pressure to make affordances around tasteful in-group behaviour more competitive than those around negative out-group behaviour. Rewarding positive in-group behaviour and punishing transgressive behaviour toward out-groups would serve as an immediate redirect.

Mechanism summary: [H]abitat/situation

Since situational factors are only interesting to the extent that they influence other levels of the stack, they could easily be folded into the model at the level they influence. As the literature reviewed in Section 6.0.3 highlights, some already do this (e.g. dual-process models collapse H- to the E-level (Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2014b)). My intervention handles above essentially collapse them to the I-level, described in the next chapter. I think this is an interesting mechanism to examine alone, however, if only to highlight that at the time of the situation, it’s often too late to alter decision-making:

Entities: situational affordances; acute/chronic stressors (threat, fatigue, time pressure); leadership/supervision cues; resource constraints.

Activities: tagging action plans with salience/utility; arousal transfer; amplification or inhibition of operations at E/T/I; shaping which control policies are even considered.

Organisation: affordance competition—situations auction action plans by comparing salience to utility; situational multipliers then bias the rest of the stack.

Intervention handles: salience management/choice architecture (make good options obvious, bad ones costly); micro-reinforcement and on-the-spot sanctions; buffer time/sleep; increase supervision density/clarity.

Key touchpoints: Gibson (2014); Cisek (2007); Cisek & Kalaska (2010); Vincent (2022); Klein (1993); Johnson et al. (2012). *See Section 6.0.3 on Habitat.*

4.4 In-group and social dynamics

If the [H]abitat, or situational, level tells us about the particular dangers of context, this level explains why the *same* context affects some groups more than others.⁹ If one were so inclined, one could easily fold this into the H-level—social situations are situations too. However, given that we are talking about the possibility of *intervention*, a mechanism that did not describe cause at the level that describes a core role of commanders—managing team dynamics—would seem ill-posed indeed.

4.4.1 Worked example: Engaged followership

Given the fondness of military ethicists for the Milgram Obedience Experiments, we will derive our mechanism from Reicher and Haslam’s (2013) explicit critique of it. Milgram (1965) claims that his participants engaged in the ethically dubious electrocution their learners because they ceased seeing themselves as the author of their acts. Instead, he suggests they saw themselves as the agent of the experimenter.

⁹The I-level is a particularly good example of mechanism that Glennan (2017) would call a “boundary object”: to the T-level below it is a macro-entity (an “in-group”) that constrains individual cognition; to the C-level above it is a micro-entity through which culture exercises control. All of my levels are “boundary objects” to some extent for the levels they are stacked between, but this level represents a departure from the more comfortable mechanisms of cognitive and behavioural science, to the socially-defined entities that have less stable boundaries, even if their interface is still clear.

Reicher and Haslam (2013) point out that Milgram’s explanation ignores the influence the learner has on the participant, and that the idea of an “Engaged Follower” better explains the situation. If the “follower” identifies with the scientific enterprise (i.e. the experimenter who *represents* it) more than they identify with the plight of the learner, they will shock the learner. As soon as the identification flips, they no longer comply (see esp. p. 123). So, in the classic experiment, when the experimenter *ordered* the participant to shock the learner, the participant typically did not comply, but when the experimenter reminded the participant of the aims of experiment when urging them to continue shocking the learner, the participant would be more likely to continue.

We might therefore consider the calculus of an engaged follower thus: we will comply with the aims of someone who represents an identity category we care about only so long as their representation of that category is stronger than the representation of other categories we care about. Representation is the force driving the compliance.

4.4.2 Intervention handles

This presents at least three levers to “wiggle”:

1. Increasing the representatives of an identity category. We know in later studies (Milgram, 1975), when a second ‘participant’ sided with the learner the original participant would no longer deliver shocks.
2. Changing the perception of how much the representative of an identity category represents the category. When Milgram later presented two *arguing* experimenters, participant compliance also dropped (Milgram & Gudehus, 1974).
3. Manipulate the binding factors—psychological and moral factors that ease moral strain. In this case, the experiment was framed deliberately from “something socially pernicious to something socially progressive” (Reicher & Haslam, 2013, p. 124). When an *order* was issued, perception of the social progressivism appears to have dropped, reducing compliance.




Figure 4: Without representatives, groups aren't very influential at all. These groups all generate social norms—ways of thinking and acting. Typically, groups share these. It's not very often that a social norm is something only done by one of the groups around you. Your 'social capital assessor' will consider the groups and their representatives, and consider the social norms on offer, and based on this information decide how much social capital you stand to gain selecting some norms to conform to over others. Importantly, the selection of social norms to adopt requires comparison to other similar groups. Without norms that distinguish the group from others, there is no way to "belong" to it. As such, the comparison groups are an almost invisible lever in the manipulation of social identity.

Mechanism summary: [I]n-group and social dynamics

As Section 6.0.4 details, the I-level seems like the level with most leverage. Even this one example is very tractable:

Entities: social identity representations, the norms of behaviour those identities imply, the social capital (prestige) associated with those norms, and the channels of communication that support them.

Activities: the way in which these things encourage individuals to accentuate group boundaries and adopt or suppress norms and behaviour.

Organisation: feedback, basically. We identify with a group, adhere to the norms, are rewarded, our identification strengthens, and the process continues. The modifier is how much group members *represent* a valuable identity.

Intervention handles: add allies/identity referents; reframe who represents “us”; surface cross-pressure between identities; tune prestige economies (recognition, awards, consequences); rotate or neutralise corrosive influencers.

Importantly, though, these identification processes must be tied directly to a moral standard, or else risk describing all social behaviour, rather than social influences on moral behaviour.

Key touchpoints: Reicher & Haslam (2013); Milgram (1965); Tajfel & Turner (1979); Brewer (2009); Coleman (1988); Hatfield et al. (1993). *See Section 6.0.4 on In-group dynamics.*

4.5 Cultural and institutional scaffolding

The last level is perhaps the most critical to an account of ethical behaviour. The cultural and institutional scaffolding is the place where moral content is *injected into the system*. Outside of group norms, which are normative in their own way, the levels E-I simply describe processes that influence the transformation of moral content into behaviour.

They are descriptions of *what is* not *what should be*. This level, instead, supplies the standards, narratives, and reward structures that define which actions are counted as right and wrong.

However, to understand how culture *constrains* behaviour, we cannot focus solely on the content of norms. We must examine the *infrastructure* through which those norms are enforced—the monitoring networks and sanction systems that make cultural standards behaviourally relevant.

4.5.1 Worked example: Tight-loose cultural constraint

To illustrate how cultural infrastructure shapes moral behaviour, I will focus on the mechanism by which cultures develop and maintain tight or loose normative constraint (Gelfand et al., 2011).

This mechanism operates through three primary entities working in sequence. First, a **threat environment**—whether historical (territorial conflict, disease, resource scarcity) or institutional (assumed mission requirements)—creates coordination pressure. Communities experiencing threat must align behaviour to respond effectively. Second, this coordination pressure activates **monitoring networks**—the social infrastructure through which norm compliance is observed. This includes both informal peer surveillance (gossip, visible observation) and formal oversight (inspection, reporting chains). Third, detected violations activate a **sanction system**—the punishment mechanisms ranging from social consequences (shaming, exclusion) to institutional penalties (disciplinary action, career consequences).

The critical organisational feature is *density*. Higher personnel density means more monitoring interactions per person, which increases detection probability, which makes sanctions more certain, which tightens behavioural constraint. A dispersed unit with minimal oversight faces loose constraint even under threat. A densely monitored unit develops tight constraint regardless of actual threat level.

Consider military versus civilian organisations working side-by-side. Military units operate under constant *assumed* threat—even in peacetime, the mission is threat-response.

This creates permanent coordination pressure. Combined with high personnel density (rank structure ensures monitoring at every level) and immediate sanctions (from spot corrections to disciplinary action), the result is *tight* cultural constraint. Civilian organisations operating alongside military units experience much lower assumed threat, lower monitoring density (autonomy is valued, peer observation is minimal), and slower, less certain sanctions (performance reviews, potential reassignment). The result is *looser* constraint—not because civilian personnel are less ethical, but because the enforcement infrastructure differs.

Critically, this mechanism tightens adherence to *whatever norms the monitoring network enforces*. When institutional-level monitoring is weak but unit-level monitoring is strong, the mechanism can tighten adherence to *deviant* unit norms rather than institutional standards. The Australian SAS case (Commonwealth of Australia, 2020) illustrates this failure mode: systematic violations persisted because monitoring networks were collapsed at the institutional level while remaining tight within units around wrong norms.

4.5.2 Intervention handles

This mechanism offers more purchase than initially apparent. While commanders cannot easily alter high-level threat assumptions or institutional doctrine, they can manipulate the enforcement infrastructure.

Personnel density is directly manipulable. Increasing the number of personnel who interact with each other increases monitoring nodes. This need not mean surveillance—simply structuring work so more people observe each other’s behaviour naturally tightens constraint. Conversely, dispersed units with high autonomy will experience looser constraint regardless of formal standards.

Monitoring salience can be heightened without adding personnel. Making oversight *psychologically present*—through visible reporting mechanisms, frequent touchpoints, or simply articulating that behaviour is observed—activates the mechanism even when actual surveillance is sparse.




Figure 5: This one isn't that complicated. Community monitoring networks detect threats and determine how people should behave as a response. Sanctions enforce that behaviour. Both monitoring networks and sanctions can be formal or informal, and threats can come from the outside world, or from within the culture. The key organisational feature is density—more people watching means more enforcement. Of course, all of this assumes a culture with norms that should be followed.

Enforcement willingness is perhaps the most critical lever. Detection without sanctions teaches that norms are not real. Swift, consistent consequences for violations—even minor ones—signal that the sanction system functions, which propagates constraint throughout the network. Conversely, institutional tolerance of “small” violations signals system failure and loosens constraint across all norms.

Finally, commanders must ensure **monitoring operates at the right level**. Unit-level monitoring is insufficient if it can tighten around deviant norms. External oversight—whether through cross-unit observers, independent reporting chains, or rotation of personnel—ensures institutional norms are what tightens, not local subculture.

For the junior commander, this level remains the place where moral content is injected. However, the mechanism makes clear that content alone is insufficient. The commander’s role is to maintain the enforcement infrastructure through which that content becomes behaviourally relevant.

Mechanism summary: [C]Cultural and institutional scaffolding

The literature overviewed in Section 6.0.5 identifies several candidate entities and activities at this level. The mechanism illustrated here highlights one plausible organisation:

Entities: threat environment (historical or institutional); monitoring networks (peer observation, formal oversight); sanction systems (social and institutional punishment mechanisms); normative frameworks (LOAC, Values and Standards).

Activities: threat detection generates coordination pressure; coordination pressure activates monitoring; monitoring detects violations; violations trigger sanctions; sanctions constrain behaviour toward norms.

Organisation: density-mediated amplification—more monitoring nodes create tighter constraint regardless of threat level; nested systems—monitoring can operate at multiple levels (institutional, unit, peer) and tighten around whatever norms the local network enforces.

Intervention handles: manipulate personnel density (increase monitoring interactions); heighten monitoring salience (make oversight psychologically present); ensure enforcement willingness (swift, consistent sanctions); maintain monitoring at institutional level (prevent unit-level norm deviation); narrative framing of exemplars and transgressions.

What this illustration makes clear is that commanders may have more purchase than initially apparent—by manipulating the enforcement infrastructure, they can influence how tightly cultural norms constrain behaviour. It also confirms that this level is where normative content is injected, making this an account of *moral* behaviour rather than simply *all* behaviour.

Key touchpoints: Gelfand et al. (2011); Commonwealth of Australia (2020); Weick & Sutcliffe (2001); Putnam (1995); Coleman (1988). *See Section 6.0.5 on Culture and institutions*

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that ethical competence emerges from a chain of nested mechanisms—visceral or affective, cognitive, situational, social, and institutional. By naming those levels and identifying the mechanistic levers attached to each, the ETHIC Stack turns abstract ethical values into an engineering diagram commanders can actually manipulate.

To be clear, the purpose of this mechanistic sketch is not to *replace* the many ethical decision-making models that already circulate within PME. The ETHIC Stack is offered to illustrate the kind of causal plumbing that must service them—informing which mechanistic levers might best fulfil their prescriptions, and thus addressing their chronic defects. My hope is that, given an illustration of *how* ethical behaviour can be manipulated, ethicists may explore with greater rigour *what* ethical behaviour can be achieved.

In closing, let me illustrate how the Stack (1) accommodates and augments what is already on offer, (2) sharpens current trends in ethical education, and (3) highlighting where

the framework is weakest, and in most need of refinement. On this last point, the most critical vulnerability is the need for explicit cultural tailoring. Without the explicit injection, by the user, of normative frameworks at the C-level, the model remains simply an incomplete account of human behaviour, rather than a mechanistic account of *ethical* behaviour.

5.1 Augmenting existing decision-aides

First, let me demonstrate how a model like mine sharpens existing models. As detailed in Section 2 and Section 3, Kem (2006) supplies three ethical *lenses* (rules, consequences, and virtues) through which to explore behaviour, but provides no lever for deciding which lens should win when they conflict. In the ETHIC Stack, those lenses are derived from the [C] level, and have hopefully crystallised at the [T]hought-level: they are content-rich schemas among which a controlled process of deliberation must choose. The problem is then reframed as a gatekeeping one—which valuation schema is the most attractive or convenient for our ‘lazy controller’ to choose? Can a commander alter that calculus by working a handle at the other four levels? The commander might now recognise that certain situations (H) produce hot limbic surges (E) which are often tethered to intuitive moral content, and thus the most attractive lens may simply be the most emotional rather than the best. By priming a different social norm (I) the commander can lower cost of engaging in controlled processing, buying more time to judge the options on offer. They might also strip euphemisms from their patterns of thought that obscure problematically biased rationalisations *at* the deliberative controller. The result may well be a more informed ethical decision than the commander who was *not* aware of the intervention handles at these levels.

The process just described conveniently¹⁰ maps onto another, more recent model of ethical decision-making—Ordiway’s (2022) Moral Terrain Coaching process. Ordiway, who inspired this particular project, has coaches assist those they’re coaching recognise visceral and situational factors which contribute at the E-level to moral judgement; recognise the

¹⁰It was not convenient. I did it on purpose.

ethical conflicts at the T-level through the lens of Ross' (2007) *prima facie* duties and Bandura's (2011) disengagement manoeuvres; and apply a social norm (I-level) by asking "what would someone I look up to think"; all of which are used to improve E-level intuitions and T-level deliberative processing in the future.¹¹

Similarly, Sandhursts' own S-CALM model (Vincent, 2022) is made more complete. Rather than a list of thirteen biases and five situational risks, it becomes a list of moral terrain features we can now map. The situational factors belong at the H-level, amplifying the arousal of the E-level as well as altering the salience and utility of certain action-plans. The consequence is a T-level that is more inclined to 'let through' intuitive judgements. Most of the common behaviours are classic I-level phenomena—norm feedback loops that influence behaviour once group identity is salient. Others sit at the T-level as value editing entities that imply moral disengagement manoeuvres when the H-level alters the behavioural affordances on offer. We now have the tools to begin exploring why and how these features coalesce to produce unethical behaviour in military contexts, which will then make which features of his three lines of moral questioning are most likely to improve the situation clear.

A final model, perhaps the most mechanistic I have encountered in this domain, is Messervey and colleagues' (2021) Revised Defence Moral Decision-Making Model. It is a laudably complete account of the E- and T-levels of Stack. The H-, I-, and C- levels stand to add greater fidelity on their mechanisms of interest, should they wish to test their empirical claims further. One might make similar observations around similar civilian-oriented model, such as Cushman's (2013), or Green's (2014b).

5.2 Sharpening recent PME trends

PME syllabi in the UK, US, Canada, and elsewhere have already begun to move past rule memorisation and toward the kinds of interventions we see here. Commonly, moral rehearsals, ethical readiness drills, stress-inoculation, and cultural and identity awareness

¹¹Indeed, Ordiway has evidence to suggest this is true, though the publication of the findings is not yet available to me.

form part of their recommendations (e.g. Karssing, 2023; Messervey et al., 2023; Ordway, 2022). The ETHIC Stack provides a coherent skeleton on which to hand these disparate efforts:

- arousal-control lanes and ethical drills are E-level interventions that improve the intuitions and habitual patterns that arise from affective tagging;
- moral case deliberation and ethical war-gaming are T-level interventions that sensitise individuals to those intuitions and refine the activity of the deliberative controller toward moral—and not merely convenient—licence to act;
- both of these classes of intervention probe the situational factors which sit at the H-level;
- prestige-economy designs (recognition and awards) manipulate the I-level;
- after-action reviews and myth-making enterprises increase C-level influence;

and so on. Mapping training onto distinct levels thus prevents the primary defect in ethical PME diagnosed in Section 2 of this article—over-weighting deliberation—while also allowing PME planners audit where their programme remains thin. A fabulous place to start would be to take something like Narvaez and Rest’s (1995) four moral components—moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and implementation—and mapping interventions to deliver these through the lens of the ETHIC Stack.

5.3 Obvious vulnerabilities, limitations, and opportunities for refinement

The ETHIC Stack is really an illustration of what is typically missing from PME ethical education, with pointers to where one might go to explore further. If it, or something like it, were to be developed further, there are a number of critical liabilities.

The primary vulnerability of the model is that it is *not* normative. It is a model of *what is*, not *what ought to be*. The purpose of the model is to explain how individuals act based on moral content, but contains none. As such, it must be *populated with local norms* before

the mechanism can tell us anything about right or wrong (though c.f. Cushman & Young, 2011). Again, this is the value of *combining* it with other models—Kem’s (2006) ethical lenses for example, or the British Army Values and Standards.

Equally critically, without this feature—the injection of moral content—the model simply lists generic components of human behaviour which have no particular reason to hang together in the manner I have described. What makes the ETHIC Stack a *moral* mechanism rather than a mechanism of behaviour writ large is that, at each tier, we must clearly single out *those entities and activities specifically recruited when an event is coded as morally significant*:

- the E-level valence system must be tuned to norm violation or fulfilment;
- the T-level controlled processing must be tuned to culturally-parameterised content-rules and their adjudication;
- the H-level must be tuned to environmental signals that toggle our moral circuitry;
- the I-level identification processes must be tied directly to a moral standard; and
- the C-level must frame certain acts as transgressions or exemplars, and attach real penalties or honours.

In the absence of these constraints, we would simply be providing a strikingly incomplete “model of everything”.

More generally, the Stack is, at best, a “how-plausibly” sketch of moral decision-making. Four more liabilities are particularly apparent:

1. My framework is agnostic about which values flow in at the C-level and crystallise at T-level. It is likely that some moral content-rules travel better than others. Perhaps, as those like Ross (2007) would have it, some are universal, which would add an additional injection-point for moral content at the E-, or perhaps T-level. Exploring the norm-injection mechanics empirically to flesh out the most critical, and incompletely described C-level seems prudent. In particular, I am only really considering an anglosphere military context, and even then I only lightly consider norm-injection of the relevant normative frameworks. Considering from other

cultural perspectives seems important.

2. Two more, related, underspecifications stand out. The first is that of the situational H-level. Situational factors are perhaps the most influential on human behaviour. Vincent has identified those which seem most correlated to unethical behaviour in the military context. Empirical treatment of these, within the ETHIC framework seems like it should be prioritised. More generally, beyond the H-level which necessitates it, I otherwise left almost entirely undiscussed the *inter-level* mechanics. How might platoon norms (I) sediment into regimental myth (C) for example? Or dialogue around disengagement (T) rewire affective tags (E)? For the purpose of diagnosing which handles have the most utility both in- and out-of-the-moment, a programme seeking to describe these would be important.
3. The brain is multi- rather than dual-process, as described in Section 2 of this paper. The current E-/T-level partition borrows from dual-process theories (e.g. Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2014b; Narvaez & Rest, 1995), and this will almost certainly require attention as the idea of a “society of mind” (Mercier & Sperber, 2017; Minsky, 1986) begins to once again come into fashion.
4. Relatedly, why five levels, and not four or six? My selection criteria was determined when the dominant manipulable organisations shifted domain—neural, cognitive, situational, relational, and cultural. However, one could make a case for further splits—the three classes of entity in the T-level, for example, might be better understood as distinct. Equally one could make a case for combining levels—situational triggers and in-group pressures seem like strata that could occupy a single, “context” level. The ETHIC acronym is cute for the purpose of a memorable sketch, but should by no means constrain the model if the levels must be adjusted.¹²

I outline these, not because I intend to address them, but because I wish to demonstrate how a truly thoughtful, mechanistic approach to ethical decision-making must look to be more than a gestural improvement over existing models.

¹²And no, for those asking the reasonable question, the acronym did not produce the levels. I certainly would not have chosen ‘early emotional’ or ‘habitat’, which if anything obscure the purpose of the level. You may thank the *post hoc* application of AI for that happy product.

5.4 Final word

The ethical application of extreme violence is the business of warfighting. It's not simply a humanistic imperative, but the determinant of post-conflict legitimacy. It emerges from *mechanisms* not prescriptions. I have demonstrated one such possible stack of nested mechanisms which begin in the gut, pass through a largely misunderstood process of "reason", are modulated by the moment, shaped by our groups, and ultimately authorised by culture. By exposing these mechanisms, and more crucially, flagging where commanders can intervene upon them, the ETHIC Stack illustrates how one might turn abstract value statements into actionable engineering diagrams. Imperfect and incomplete, the model nevertheless provides what the overwhelming majority of ethical models lack: a map of the causal, moral terrain upon which we must fight.

6 Appendix A: Alternative Candidates for Mechanistic Accounts

The main text of this article develops a single plausible mechanism per level as an illustration of the kind of thing required to improve ethical decision-making literature in the military context.

Of course, as I make clear in several places, this stack of mine isn't designed to be comprehensive. As such, I have corralled some of the other, relevant literature that could equally be used to describe the entities, activities, and organisation of the mechanism at each level of the ETHIC Stack. Indeed, this literature could be used to create a different stack, or solve a specific ethical problem.

6.0.1 Early, affective circuitry

The **entities** here would appear to be the visceral and affective valuation systems of the nervous system, and the pattern recognition machinery that informs them. The **activities** are the arousal and affective tagging produced by those patterns and which form our intuitions, as well as the learning processes that fix and alter our basic stimulus-response pathways. The **organising principle** is the way that pattern-matching generates valuations of goodness or badness, and any basic action routines those valuations might activate.

Candidate neural substrate in which to house the E-level entities would almost certainly include the subcortical affective and salience networks of the brain (Daggleish, 2004; Kandel et al., 2013; Seeley, 2019), the interoceptive integrative properties of the anterior insula and adjoining orbitofrontal cortex (Craig, 2009), and the cortico-basal loops which appear to form the basis of our habitual/automatic responding machinery (Graybiel, 2008).

The activities are less easy to house comfortably in theory, but we can make an attempt. The mere exposure effect appears to capture precisely the kind of pre-cognitive phenom-

ena I am interested in, and the Representation-Matching model of Montoya and colleagues (2017) seems an excellent place to start, not least because their meta-analytic findings indicate “people, without conscious processing or (mis)attributional assessments, come to evaluate well-learned stimuli as ‘correct’ and ‘how things should be’ ” (p. 476). We might also consider something like LeDoux’s (LeDoux, 2012) or Damasio’s (Dunn et al., 2006) account of the rapid affective tagging of objects which bias our appraisals, though the evidence in support of them is far from settled. The autonomic arousal that funnels attention toward the tagged object and prepares stereotypical motor programmes would also play a role (e.g. Lang, 1995). Reinforcement loops that compile habits, or scripted “implementation intentions” would complete a preliminary set (e.g. Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).

What seems critical, however, is to isolate *moral* affect in particular (see Tangney et al., 2007 for an overview). Threat and fear are well documented, but insufficient. Disgust also seems an early affective valence (Calder et al., 2001). But morally relevant emotions aren’t solely negative. Panksepp (Panksepp, 2005) for example includes care as an early valence in both humans and animals, and the aforementioned mere exposure effect is approach oriented (liking/familiarity) in nature, both of which present interesting targets. Recent work on awe, gratitude, and elevation (e.g. Keltner & Piff, 2020; Piff et al., 2015) also broaden the positive affective side of moral intuition.

The global organising principle is easier to land. George Mandler’s (Mandler, 1980) foundational work on the generation of emotion seems an entirely appropriate fundament. A basis for much of the social psychology of emotion, and derived from “an extensive, but discontinuous, line of reasoning”, Mandler noted that the:

common insight is that many if not all emotional states arise out of the interruption of ongoing psychological events, out of the conflicts and the discrepancies among them, or from the frustrations of actions.

Thus, an unexpected event—some norm violation or the elicitation of moral disgust perhaps—or a goal-thwarting frustration—an obstacle to norm fulfilment, for example—interrupts ongoing behaviour. Visceral signals respond by mobilising autonomic energy

and then hand off to higher levels a problem already helpful tagged with a valence—threat, reward, or uncertainty, for example. Under high arousal, routinised action plans are preferentially released unless there is some kind of counter-programming in place.

It seems important also to attend to Feldman Barrett’s (Barrett, 2017; 2014; Barrett & Simmons, 2015) developments, attending to the fact that much of what the brain does is *predict* the future from patterns experienced in the past. On this account, some early emotional valence comes from *preparations* to respond to *anticipated* interruptions, rather than just those interruptions that are occurring. As such, not all early emotional valence will be obvious to us, as not all early emotion valence is responding to actual circumstances.

6.0.2 Thought level schemas

It seems to me that we must have at least three broad classes of **entities**: (1) value-categorising modules whose **activity** is to tie gut feelings to moral foundations; (2) value-editing modules whose **activity** is to license one pattern of thinking and behaving over others; and (3) self-efficacy beliefs about our ability to do these things well, which modulate the activity of the other two entities. The **organising principle** appears to be something like a lazy controller, or gatekeeper—allow the intuitive verdict of the E-level to pass through unchanged into action, or to *transform* that intuition into a licence to act when multiple value-categorisations modules are activated at once.

To add to this general mechanism sketch, we should also consider two pieces of literature which sit between the E-level and the T-level. First, there is an important question about the *timing* of the hand-off of the valence generated at the E-level to the T-level. Cortisol-reactivity work demonstrates that there is often *delayed* rather than immediate impairment of the executive networks the T-level implies (see Schwabe et al., 2022), which has implications for whether controlled processing is more likely to happen by default, or less, and under what circumstances.

Next, we should take Wilson and Schooler’s (2008) line of enquiry exploring that *thinking* can *worsen* the quality of decisions when intuitions are well trained. As they note:

“[a]nalyzing reasons can focus people’s attention on nonoptimal criteria”. This implies that thickening our moral intuitions may be more important than working with our T-level schemas, unless we have time to train both systems.

More specific to this level, and with regard to value-categorising entities specifically, it seems appropriate to commence with Haidt’s contributions. A large and diverse empirical record supports Haidt’s basic claim that multiple, partially independent moral concerns structure everyday intuitive judgement—care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty (Haidt, 2001, 2012). However, other perspectives on the same class of entities exist. We have already spoken of Kidder’s (1995) common ethical dilemmas—truth versus loyalty, justice versus mercy, short-term versus long-term, and individual versus community. Ordiway (2022), the military ethicist who inspired this project of mine, prefers Ross’ (Ross, 2007) *prima facie* duties: an urge to keep our promises, an urge to make amends, an urge to return favours, an urge to improve the lot of others and ourselves, an urge to do no harm, and an urge to distribute pleasure according to merit.

Importantly, how these entities crystallise from the higher [C]ultural-level into thought-level schemas should be considered when selecting a framework to explore. McHugh and colleagues (McHugh et al., 2022) explore this explicitly in their *Moral Judgement as Categorization (MJAC)* theory, exploring how cultural and situational context influences the learning and habituation of moral categories.

These value-categorising entities, whichever framework one chooses, engage in the activity of intuitive appraisal—the rapid matching of the affective tag passed from the previous level to cognitive moral content surrounding the “rightness” of a thing. This activity could be couched in any almost any cognitive appraisal theory (e.g. Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kelley & Michela, 1980; Lazarus, 1991)—anything which connects a feeling to cognitive content. What is *not* clear is whether these entities exist at this level, at the more automatic E-level, or indeed some new intermediate level. This decision I leave to the pleasure of the reader.

Ordiway (2022) recommends a most tractable candidate for the second class of entities—the value-editing modules. For this, he uses Bandura’s catalogue of moral disengagement

mechanisms (Bandura, 2011). These comprise eight linguistic or cognitive reframing manoeuvres that—as an activity—dampen our self-sanctions:

1. Moral Justifications allow us to reframe an act as as serving a worthy or higher purpose (“we had to torture him to save lives”).
2. Euphemistic Labelling is where we swap harsh descriptors for sanitised ones (“enhanced interrogation”, “collateral damage”).
3. Advantageous Comparisons contrast a contemplated act with something far worse (“at least we’re not torturing him like the last unit did”).
4. Distortion/Minimisation of Consequences is the process of downplaying harms (“he’ll be fine in a couple of days”).
5. Dehumanisation is the process of denying a victim full moral status (“they’re savages; they don’t feel pain the way we do”).
6. Then three that centre on the re-attribution of responsibility:
 - Displacement of Responsibility allows us to attribute agency to another figure (“I was just following orders”).
 - Diffusion of Responsibility is where we spread agency across a group, rather than attribute it to an individual (“the whole platoon agreed this was necessary”).
 - Attribution of Blame is where we cast the victim as responsible for the harm (“he brought it on himself by running”).

Harmon-Jones and Mills (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019) suggest the formula for this justification process in terms of Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance:

Formally speaking, the magnitude of dissonance equals the number of dissonant cognitions [cognitions which oppose each other] divided by the number of consonant cognitions [cognitions which follow from each other] plus the number of dissonant cognitions . This is referred to as the dissonance ratio.

Dissonance refers both to the idea that two cognitions can oppose each other (i.e. be dissonant), and the psychological tension that often results. Thus, we will engage in processes

that reduce the dissonance, like those detailed above until the magnitude of dissonance is low enough to reduce the expected value of engaging in controlled processing, thus allowing the surviving verdict through.

Literature on what circumstances prompt what disengagement mechanisms already exist. For example, Mazar, Amir, and Ariely's (2008) observation that inattention and categorisation malleability allow us to bend moral rules in order to maintain a positive self-concept. Or, Monin and Miller's (2001) observation that having prior moral high-ground makes one more willing to occupy morally dubious ground in future. Or Bazerman and Tenbrunsel's (2011) 'blind spots': a catalogue of circumstances under which our "wants" and "shoulds" lead to motivated forgetting or (un)intentional blindness to moral content.

Bandura also has a candidate for our final class of entity—self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982). Self-efficacy describes our beliefs around our capacity to do something—in this case, enact an ethical alternative. Activity-wise, low self-efficacy may make disengagement scripts more attractive, or encourage us to defer to a higher level in the ETHIC Stack for input, where high self-efficacy would do the opposite. I am not wedded to Bandura for this, I should point out, he simply served as a convenient segue. Any theory that attends to the role of uncertainty in decision-making seems as though it might service the same explanatory gap. However, a sense of efficacy is necessary for outcomes such as moral attentiveness and moral humility—the sense that one can intervene in ethical scenarios has a direct relationship to sensitivity to moral content (e.g. Reynolds, 2008).

Lastly, the overarching organising principle—that of a lazy controller which passes the intuition onwards unchanged, or transforms it—seems to have an obvious overlap with the literature on cognitive control.¹³ Converging work (e.g. Seeley, 2019; Shenhav et al., 2013) appears to demonstrate that certain networked regions of the brain synthesise precisely the kinds of red flags we are speaking to—response conflict, outcome stakes, errors in prediction, social surveillance, and visceral arousal—into a single quantity: is the cost of recruiting deliberation justified by the expected benefit? When that quan-

¹³Though equally, this might only be true because this is my speciality.

tivity crosses threshold, deliberative resources are engaged, often to actively licence the intuition through disengagement; when it does not, the intuitive verdict passes upward unedited. The expected-value of control theory used in this paper is simply one example among many that could be explored for their insights into processes of moral deliberation.

6.0.3 Habitat, or situational factors

Fundamentally, the literature around situational influences on ethical behaviour indicate that **entities** at this level are situations, or situational factors, and the **activities** they engage in are to amplify, dampen, or otherwise interfere with the organisation of other levels. The global **organising principle**, then, is that of a some kind of multiplier. Importantly, these mechanistic pieces must be tuned to environmental signals that toggle our moral circuitry or risk being so expansive as to be useless.

There's an important question as to whether the H-level is strictly necessary, or whether collapsing it into the E-level, as dual-process models do (e.g. Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2014b), might make for a more parsimonious account of moral behaviour. Indeed, as situational factors are only interesting to the extent that they influence other levels of the stack, they could be folded into the model at the level they influence. However, there is some intuitive value here.

For example, Vincent's (Vincent, 2022) situational factors are well-received by military audiences, because they are obvious situational *entities* which imply a clear associated activity:

- Danger, threat, and fear (hostile environment/emotional compromise) spike arousal, hastening the E-level tagging and release of habitual scripts, while also sharpening the kinds of social effects I am yet to describe at the I-level.
- Exposure to chronic brutality (normalised violence) has the opposite effect, dampening E-level affective tagging, while also providing room to engage in disengagement manoeuvres at the T-level.
- Sleep deprivation, fatigue, and time pressure (lack of resources) impedes cognitive

control, and thus lowers the thresholds for control at the T-level, while also making one more susceptible to E-level as well as in-group (I) and cultural (C) level influences.

- Authoritative pressure and hierarchical obedience (weak leadership) displaces responsibility upwards, perhaps emphasising I-level in-group influences and certainly encouraging T-level licensing of behaviour.
- Ambiguity (lack of supervision) increases T-level uncertainty, enhancing the influences of I- and C-level influences.

So on, and so forth. Each of these are uncontroversial claims, sketched as they are in the broadest possible terms. A situational factor acts to enhance or inhibit the mechanism at one or more levels, with a corollary effect on the action of the mechanism at the remaining levels. The global organisational effect at this level thus has the potential to be the most pervasive.

Some likely candidates for exploring this more empirically seem obvious. We might start with two- (Dror, 2017; Zillmann, 2008) and three-factor theories (Russell & Mehrabian, 1977) of sympathetic emotional transfer from one event to another. Alternatively, Klein's (1993) Recognition-Primed Decision-Making, or his later advancement in the Data/Frame Model of Sensemaking (2007) or even Shortland, Alison, and Barrett-Pink's (2018) *critique*; Endsley's Situation Awareness model (2012); and Gibson's (2014) Theory of Affordances, as well as modern advances into neuroscience (e.g. Cisek, 2007) all describe the ways in which contextual situations select for particular T-level control thresholds—they specify what cognitive schemas should become active. Of particular mention is the *incremental* nature of moral disengagement—the 'slippery slope' dynamic (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; see also Vincent, 2022 on 'small steps').

One particularly likely candidate for *intervention* might be the behavioural economist project around Choice Architecture (Hansen, 2016; Johnson et al., 2012). This is the idea, made famous by Thaler and Sunstein's pop-science book "Nudge" (2008), that the small, often incidental details of a decision environment (default options or the order of options for example) can be deliberately arranged so as to steer people toward welfare-

enhancing choices without restricting the set of options available to them. While the empirical evidence in support of the project have recently come into a troubling degree of contention (Maier et al., 2022; Osman et al., 2020), it seems a good candidate program to explore how the decision environment can steer morally-enhancing choices too, assuming that we also adopt the lessons of the programmes failings. This is particularly true as it has already been explored for how it can generate *unethical* outcomes (Dana et al., 2007).

6.0.4 In-group and social dynamics

The [I]n-group level appears, *prima facie*, obvious as the lever with greatest mechanical purchase. Emphasising a single norm has the potential to re-route innumerable T-level controller decisions and generate affiliated E-level affect for as long as the norm remains dominant. Ignore the I-level, and even the most rigorous E- and T-level training could be undone by a particularly corrosive platoon climate.

Broadly, the **entities** that comprise mechanisms at this level are social identity representations, the norms of behaviour those social identities imply, the social capital associated with those norms, and the channels of communication that allow the individual to remain informed of all these things. The **activities** would be the way in which these things encourage individuals to accentuate group boundaries and adopt or suppress norms and behaviour. The overarching **organising principle** is that of feedback—our behaviour at a given timepoint is influenced by normative feedback from the in-group identities we are surrounded by. The strength of that feedback is a function of identity strength, as well as the social capital behaving a certain way would garner.

Importantly, these identification processes must be tied directly to a moral standard, or else risk describing all social behaviour, rather than social influences on moral behaviour.

The most critical candidate theories, both to describe many of the entities and activities, but also to describe the organising principle, are those that surround the ways in which we adopt our social identities. So Social Identity and Self Categorisation Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) combined with Brewer's (Brewer, 2009) Optimal Distinctiveness indicates

that when individuals can see the ways a group represents who they are, or wish to be, in comparison to other, similar groups, they will accentuate their membership to that group in their behaviour. Thus, the greater the identification, the more group norms are likely to influence our behaviour.

Many of these things can be explained in similar terms using the language of Social Capital (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998), with the added benefit of helping derive the influence of the overarching C-level influences that shape the norms in the first place. For example, social identities are naturalistically nested (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The fireteam sits within the section sits within the platoon sits within the company, and so on. Exploring these interlined norm-chains may highlight interesting levers that span from the institutional norm-injection all the way down to small group leadership.

For example, intervening in the moment could be as simple as priming one of these nested groups over the other. Otherwise, crafting the context that makes the right group norms salient could be as simple as emphasising the positive distinctions that are reflected by your group as opposed to some deficient out-group.

Reicher and Haslam's work on "identity leaders", as described in the main text, is particularly appealing for *leaders* of teams (2005; Reicher & Haslam, 2013). Beyond engaged followership, this literature describes the phenomenon of individuals with particular influence over norm definition. This force might equally be well described by the concept of 'influential nodes' within human systems literature, coined, I believe, with Moreno's (1934, Chapter 13) "stars".

Alongside our influential identity shapers, we might also consider the role of prestige economies in policing conformity, but also in stripping out-groups of moral standing (e.g. Blader & Tyler, 2002; Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Opatow, 1990). There is an important psychological difference, in in-group comparison, between noting the virtues of your own group and the failings of another.

Grossman, in *On Killing* (2014), does not organise his content around these ideas, but reading his chapters will yield a fairly discrete package that resemble these ingredients: au-

thoritative sanctions, group absolution, dehumanisation, moral displacement, absence of countervailing norms, etc.

Lastly, we must consider the way in which a group can rapidly spread affect among the individuals. At a minimum, we should consider Hatfield and colleagues' (1993) concept of Emotional Contagion—the process of ‘catching’ the feelings of others through the synchronisation of expressions, cues, and other behaviours. Also relevant would be Haslam and Reicher's work on the role of identity in mobilising groups (Reicher & Haslam, 2012). It also feels as though more could be made of the literature on inter-group communication and the vectors for these things, but for now this will suffice.

6.0.5 Cultural and institutional scaffolding

The **entities** at this level would appear to be the large-scale normative frameworks¹⁴ that surround a fighting force, the broader cultural schemas in which a unit is embedded, and the enforcement infrastructure through which norms become behaviourally relevant—monitoring networks and sanction systems. The **activities** these entities engage in include the detection of threats and violations, the activation of coordination pressure, the enforcement of sanctions, and the longer-term processes of norm codification, transmission, and cultural memory formation. The overarching **organisational principle** appears to be top-down constraint—the high-level biases which influence the operation of each lower level—with one plausible mechanism being the density-mediated amplification of monitoring and sanctions illustrated in the main text.

Beyond this enforcement infrastructure account, several complementary perspectives illuminate different aspects of cultural constraint. Work on social capital bridges small and large collective action, potentially explaining how trust networks enable norm enforcement without formal monitoring (Coleman, 1988; Patulny & Lind Haase Svendsen, 2007; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1995). Coleman's (1988) foundational work identifies how closure in social networks (where A knows B, B knows C, and C knows A) creates

¹⁴Normative frameworks are structured sets of values, principles, and rules that articulate how people “ought” to, or should behave. The British Army Values and Standards are an example of a normative framework. A member of the British Army *should be* courageous, disciplined, respectful of others, and so on. They *ought to behave* lawfully, appropriately, and totally professionally.

conditions for norm enforcement through reputation systems. Putnam's (1995) later application to civic engagement demonstrates how declining social capital—the erosion of these trust networks—weakens institutional constraint. For military contexts, this suggests that units with denser informal social networks may develop stronger normative constraint independent of formal oversight.

Weick and Sutcliffe's work on collective sensemaking in organisations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) speaks to the *activities* by which cultures interpret and respond to norm violations. Their concept of “collective mindfulness” describes how organisations maintain sensitivity to operational complexity and resist normalising deviance. This may illuminate not just whether violations are detected, but whether they are *interpreted* as violations or rationalised as acceptable variance—a critical question when enforcement infrastructure identifies behaviour but must determine whether it warrants sanction.

Ashworth's (e.g. Ashworth, 2011) work on collective memory and heritage illuminates how cultural narratives shape identity and exemplar selection. Heritage, on this account, is not passive memory but active construction—the selective emphasis of certain historical events to define “who we are”. For military ethics, this suggests that which historical examples become salient (heroic restraint versus aggressive victory) may shape which norms monitoring networks enforce. The activities here would be narrative framing, myth-making, and ritual commemoration.

Institutional Logics and Organisational Fields literature (e.g. DiMaggio et al., 1983; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) explains how rule systems and practices diffuse across collectives. DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism—coercive (regulatory pressure), mimetic (imitation under uncertainty), and normative (professional socialisation)—may explain how normative frameworks propagate across military organisations even without direct enforcement. This addresses a gap in the enforcement infrastructure account: where do the *norms themselves* come from before monitoring networks enforce them?

Bayesian approaches to moral reasoning offer a mathematical formalisation. One might model cultural norms as *normative priors* in a continuously updated “moral

warrant” score (Lin, 2024). The individual’s assessment of whether an action is morally warranted would combine this cultural prior with situational evidence from lower levels of the ETHIC Stack (E-level affect, T-level reasoning, H-level affordances, I-level group norms). The tighter the culture, the stronger the prior, making it more resistant to situational evidence. This formalism could make precise predictions about when cultural versus situational factors dominate moral judgement, though it remains to be mechanised in terms of neural or social entities and activities.

What seems critical across these approaches is attending to both *content* and *infrastructure*. Approaches focused solely on normative frameworks (what the norms are) cannot explain variation in constraint when norm content is held constant. Approaches focused solely on enforcement infrastructure cannot explain which norms get selected for enforcement. A complete account at this level likely requires specifying how norm content emerges (institutional logics, narrative construction), how it becomes psychologically relevant (Bayesian priors, social capital), and how it constrains behaviour (monitoring and sanction systems).

For the purpose of intervention, different theories highlight different levers. Enforcement infrastructure accounts point to monitoring density and sanction certainty. Social capital accounts point to network closure and trust-building. Sensemaking accounts point to interpretive frames and organisational mindfulness. Heritage accounts point to narrative and exemplar selection. The choice of mechanism depends on the specific ethical challenge and the organisational level at which intervention is possible.

References

- Ashworth, G. J. (2011). Heritage in Ritual and Identity. In *Ritual, Heritage and Identity*. Routledge India.
- Balban, M. Y., Neri, E., Kogon, M. M., Weed, L., Nouriani, B., Jo, B., Holl, G., Zeitzer, J. M., Spiegel, D., & Huberman, A. D. (2023). Brief structured respiration practices enhance mood and reduce physiological arousal. *Cell Reports Medicine*, 4(1). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.xcrm.2022.100895>
- Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. *American Psychologist*, 37(2), 122–147. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.37.2.122>
- Bandura, A. (2011). Moral Disengagement. In *The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470672532.wbep165>
- Barrett, L. F. (2017). The theory of constructed emotion: An active inference account of interoception and categorization. *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, 12(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw154>
- Barrett, L. F., & Russell, J. A. (2014). *The psychological construction of emotion*. Guilford Publications.
- Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 16(7), 419–429.
- Bazerman, M. H., & Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2011). *Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What's Right and What to Do about It*. Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837991>
- Bechtel, W. (2007). *Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience*. Psychology Press.
- Beck, A. T. (1979). *Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders*. Penguin.
- Blader, S. L., & Tyler, T. R. (2002). Justice and empathy: What motivates people to help others? In *The justice motive in everyday life* (pp. 226–250). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499975.013>
- Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior

- cingulate cortex: An update. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 8(12), 539–546. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003>
- Brand, C. (2016). Dimensions of Moral Intuitions – Metaethics, Epistemology and Moral Psychology. In C. Brand (Ed.), *Dual-process theories in moral psychology: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Theoretical, Empirical and Practical Considerations* (pp. 19–40). Springer VS.
- Brewer, M. B. (2009). Motivations underlying ingroup identification: Optimal distinctiveness and beyond. In *Intergroup Relations* (pp. 22–41). Psychology Press.
- Calder, A. J., Lawrence, A. D., & Young, A. W. (2001). Neuropsychology of fear and loathing. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 2(5), 352–363. <https://doi.org/10.1038/35072584>
- Centre for Army Leadership (CAL). (2021). *Army Leadership Doctrine - AC 72029*. British Ministry of Defence.
- Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: The affordance competition hypothesis. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 362(1485), 1585–1599. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2054>
- Cisek, P., & Kalaska, J. F. (2010). Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world full of action choices. *Annual Review of Neuroscience*, 33(July), 269–298. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.051508.135409>
- Clayton, S., & Opatow, S. (2003). Justice and Identity: Changing Perspectives on What Is Fair. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 7(4), 298–310. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_03
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, S95–S120.
- Commonwealth of Australia. (2020). *The Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry*. Commonwealth of Australia.
- Craig, A. D. (2009). How do you feel—now? The anterior insula and human awareness. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 10(1), 59–70.
- Craver, C. F. (2007). *Explaining the brain : Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience* / Carl F. Craver. Oxford : Clarendon, c2007.

- Crayne, M. R. (2025). Our Most Powerful Weapon: The Army Ethic. *Harding Paper*, 25(1).
- Cushman, F. (2013). Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 17(3), 273–292. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868313495594>
- Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011). Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations. *Cognitive Science*, 35(6), 1052–1075. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x>
- Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm. *Psychological Science*, 17(12), 1082–1089. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x>
- Dalgleish, T. (2004). The emotional brain. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 5(7), 583–589. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1432>
- Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. *Economic Theory*, 33(1), 67–80. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z>
- Davis, M. S. (1971). That’s interesting!: Towards a phenomenology of sociology and a sociology of phenomenology. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1(2), 309–344. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839317100100211>
- de Bruin, B., Zaal, R., & Jeurissen, R. (2023). Pitting Virtue Ethics Against Situationism: An Empirical Argument for Virtue. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 26(3), 463–479. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10381-5>
- Deakin, S. (2014). Leadership: Proceedings Symposium Held Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 33. *Leadership: Proceedings Symposium Held Royal Military Academy Sandhurst*, 33.
- DiMaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W., et al. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147–160.
- Doris, J. M. (2002). *Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior*. Cambridge University Press.

- Dror, O. E. (2017). Deconstructing the “two factors”: The historical origins of the schachter–singer theory of emotions. *Emotion Review*, 9(1), 7–16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916639663>
- Duncan, J. (2010). The multiple-demand (MD) system of the primate brain: Mental programs for intelligent behaviour. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 14(4), 172–179.
- Dunn, B. D., Dalgleish, T., & Lawrence, A. D. (2006). The somatic marker hypothesis: A critical evaluation. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, 30(2), 239–271. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.07.001>
- Ellis, A. (1962). *Reason and emotion in psychotherapy*.
- Endsley, M. R. (2012). Situation awareness. *Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics*, 553–568.
- Fedorenko, E., Duncan, J., & Kanwisher, N. (2013). Broad domain generality in focal regions of frontal and parietal cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 110(41), 16616–16621. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1315235110>
- Frömer, R., Lin, H., Dean Wolf, C. K., Inzlicht, M., & Shenhav, A. (2021). Expectations of reward and efficacy guide cognitive control allocation. *Nature Communications*, 12(1), 1030. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21315-z>
- Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., Duan, L., Al-maliach, A., Ang, S., Arnadottir, J., Aycan, Z., Boehnke, K., Boski, P., Cabecinhas, R., Chan, D., Chhokar, J., D’Amato, A., Subirats Ferrer, M., Fischlmayr, I. C., ... Yamaguchi, S. (2011). Differences Between Tight and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study. *Science*, 332(6033), 1100–1104. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1197754>
- Gibson, J. J. (2014). The theory of affordances:(1979). In *The people, place, and space reader* (pp. 56–60). Routledge.
- Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic Decision Making. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 62(Volume 62, 2011), 451–482. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346>
- Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2009). When misconduct goes unnoticed: The acceptability of gradual erosion in others’ unethical behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45(4), 708–719. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.013>

- Glennan, S. (2017). *The new mechanical philosophy*. Oxford University Press.
- Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement: A Meta-analysis of Effects and Processes. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 38, pp. 69–119). Academic Press. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(06\)38002-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38002-1)
- Graybiel, A. M. (2008). Habits, rituals, and the evaluative brain. *Annual Review of Neuroscience*, Vol 34, 31(1), 359–387.
- Greene, J. (2014a). *Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them*. Penguin.
- Greene, J. D. (2014b). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics. *Ethics*, 124(4), 695–726. <https://doi.org/10.1086/675875>
- Grossman, D. (2014). *On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society*. Open Road Media.
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review*, 108(4), 814.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. Vintage.
- Hansen, P. G. (2016). The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: Does the Hand Fit the Glove? *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, 7(1), 155–174. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1867299X00005468>
- Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (2019). An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory. In E. Harmon-Jones (Ed.), *Cognitive dissonance: Reexamining a pivotal theory in psychology (2nd ed.)*. American Psychological Association. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0000135-000>
- Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1993). Emotional contagion. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 2(3), 96–100.
- Hofmann, S. G., Asnaani, A., Vonk, I. J., Sawyer, A. T., & Fang, A. (2012). The efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. *Cognitive Therapy and Research*, 36, 427–440.

- Johnson, E. J., Shu, S. B., Dellaert, B. G. C., Fox, C., Goldstein, D. G., Häubl, G., Lar-
rick, R. P., Payne, J. W., Peters, E., Schkade, D., Wansink, B., & Weber, E. U. (2012).
Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture. *Marketing Letters*, 23(2), 487–504.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-012-9186-1>
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Kandel, E., Schwartz, J., Jessell, T., Siegelbaum, S., & Hudspeth, A. J. (2013). *Principles
of Neural Science* (5th ed.). McGraw-Hill Professional.
- Karssing, E. (2023). The E-Word (Emotions) in Military Ethics Education: Making Use
of the Dual-Process Model of Moral Psychology. In E.-H. Kramer & T. Molendijk
(Eds.), *Violence in Extreme Conditions* (pp. 131–143). Springer International Pub-
lishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16119-3_10
- Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1980). Attribution Theory and Research. *Annual
Review of Psychology*, 31(Volume 31, 1980), 457–501. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.002325>
- Keltner, D., & Piff, P. K. (2020). Self-Transcendent Awe as a Moral Grounding of Wis-
dom. *Psychological Inquiry*, 31(2), 160–163. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2020.1750927>
- Kem, J. D. (2006). Use of the "Ethical Triangle" in Military Ethical Decision Making.
PAM, 11.
- Kidder, R. M. (1995). *How good people make tough choices*. Morrow New York.
- Klein, G. A. (1993). A recognition-primed decision (RPD) model of rapid decision mak-
ing. In *Decision making in action: Models and methods* (pp. 138–147). Ablex Pub-
lishing.
- Klein, G., Phillips, J. K., Rall, E. L., & Peluso, D. A. (2007). A data-frame theory of
sensemaking. In *Expertise out of context* (pp. 118–160). Psychology Press.
- Lang, P. J. (1995). The emotion probe: Studies of motivation and attention. *American
Psychologist*, 50(5), 372–385. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.50.5.372>
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and Adaptation*. Oxford University Press.
- LeDoux, J. (2012). Rethinking the Emotional Brain. *Neuron*, 73(4), 653–676. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.004>

- Lessons and Doctrine Directorate ADF. (2021). *ADF Leadership* (3rd ed.). Lessons and Doctrine Directorate.
- Lin, H. (2024). Bayesian Epistemology. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2024). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about Mechanisms. *Philosophy of Science*, 67(1), 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1086/392759>
- Maier, M., Bartoš, F., Stanley, T. D., Shanks, D. R., Harris, A. J. L., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2022). No evidence for nudging after adjusting for publication bias. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 119(31), e2200300119. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2200300119>
- Mandler, G. (1980). The Generation of Emotion: A Psychological Theory. In *Theories of Emotion* (pp. 219–243). Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-558701-3.50015-6>
- Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 45(6), 633–644. <https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633>
- McHugh, C., McGann, M., Igou, E. R., & Kinsella, E. L. (2022). Moral Judgment as Categorization (MJAC). *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 17(1), 131–152. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691621990636>
- Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2017). *The Enigma of Reason*. Harvard University Press.
- Messervey, D. L., Peach, J. M., Dean, W. H., & Nelson, E. A. (2023). Training for heat-of-the-moment thinking: Ethics training to prepare for operations. *Armed Forces & Society*, 49(3), 593–611. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221088325>
- Messervey, D., Dean, W. H., & Nelson, E. (2021). Making Moral Decisions Under Stress: A Revised Model for Defence. *Canadian Military Journal*, 21(2).
- Milgram, S. (1965). *Obedience [motion picture]*. Available from Penn State Media Sales.
- Milgram, S. (1975). *Obedience to authority: An experimental view*. Harper & Row.
- Milgram, S., & Gudehus, C. (1974). *Obedience to authority*. Harper New York.
- Minsky, M. (1986). *Society of mind*. Simon and Schuster.

- Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(1), 33–43. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33>
- Montoya, R. M., Horton, R. S., Vevea, J. L., Citkowitz, M., & Lauber, E. A. (2017). A re-examination of the mere exposure effect: The influence of repeated exposure on recognition, familiarity, and liking. *Psychological Bulletin*, 143(5), 459–498. <https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000085>
- Moreno, J. L. (1934). *Who shall survive? A new approach to the problem of human inter-relations*.
- Musschenga, A. W. (2008). Moral Judgement and Moral Reasoning. In M. Düwell, C. Rehmann-Sutter, & D. Mieth (Eds.), *The Contingent Nature of Life: Bioethics and Limits of Human Existence* (pp. 131–146). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6764-8_12
- Narvaez, D., & Rest, J. (1995). The four components of acting morally. *Moral Behavior and Moral Development: An Introduction*, 1(1), 385–400.
- Oeberst, A., & Imhoff, R. (2023). Toward parsimony in bias research: A proposed common framework of belief-consistent information processing for a set of biases. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 18(6), 1464–1487. <https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221148147>
- Opatow, S. (1990). *Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction* (No. 1; Vol. 46, pp. 1–20). Wiley Online Library.
- Ordiway, B. (2022). Developing SOF Moral Reasoning. *Special Warfare*, 34(3).
- Osman, M., McLachlan, S., Fenton, N., Neil, M., Löfstedt, R., & Meder, B. (2020). Learning from Behavioural Changes That Fail. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 24(12), 969–980. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.09.009>
- Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 14(1), 30–80. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.004>
- Patulny, R. V., & Lind Haase Svendsen, G. (2007). Exploring the social capital grid: Bonding, bridging, qualitative, quantitative. *International Journal of Sociology and*

- Social Policy*, 27(1/2), 32–51. <https://doi.org/10.1108/01443330710722742>
- Piff, P. K., Dietze, P., Feinberg, M., Stancato, D. M., & Keltner, D. (2015). Awe, the small self, and prosocial behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 108(6), 883–899. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000018>
- Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 1–24.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. In *The city reader* (pp. 188–196). Routledge.
- Reicher, S. D., & Haslam, S. A. (2012). Change we can believe in: The role of social identity, cognitive alternatives, and leadership in group mobilization and social transformation. In *Culture and social change: Transforming society through the power of ideas* (pp. 53–73). IAP Information Age Publishing.
- Reicher, S., & Haslam, S. A. (2013). Towards a 'Science of Movement': Identity, Authority and Influence in the Production of Social Stability and Social Change. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 1(1), 112–131. <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v1i1.266>
- Reicher, S., Haslam, S. A., & Hopkins, N. (2005). Social identity and the dynamics of leadership: Leaders and followers as collaborative agents in the transformation of social reality. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 16(4), 547–568. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2005.06.007>
- Reynolds, S. J. (2008). Moral attentiveness: Who pays attention to the moral aspects of life? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 93(5), 1027–1041. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.93.5.1027>
- Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (2011). *The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology*. Pinter & Martin Publishers.
- Ross, W. D. (2007). *The right and the good* (P. Stratton-Lake, Ed.; Reprinted). Clarendon Press.
- Russell, J. A., & Mehrabian, A. (1977). Evidence for a three-factor theory of emotions. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 11(3), 273–294. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566\(77\)90037-x](https://doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(77)90037-x)

- Sauer, H. (2019). *Moral thinking, fast and slow*. Routledge.
- Schwabe, L., Hermans, E. J., Joëls, M., & Roozendaal, B. (2022). Mechanisms of memory under stress. *Neuron*, *110*(9), 1450–1467. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2022.02.020>
- Schwabe, L., & Wolf, O. T. (2011). Stress-induced modulation of instrumental behavior: From goal-directed to habitual control of action. *Behavioural Brain Research*, *219*(2), 321–328.
- Seeley, W. W. (2019). The salience network: A neural system for perceiving and responding to homeostatic demands. *Journal of Neuroscience*, *39*(50), 9878–9882.
- Shenhav, A., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2013). The expected value of control: An integrative theory of anterior cingulate cortex function. *Neuron*, *79*(2), 217–240. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.007>
- Shields, G. S., Sazma, M. A., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2016). The effects of acute stress on core executive functions: A meta-analysis and comparison with cortisol. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *68*, 651–668.
- Shortland, N., Alison, L., & Barrett-Pink, C. (2018). Military (in)decision-making process: A psychological framework to examine decision inertia in military operations. *Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science*, *19*(6), 752–772. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1463922X.2018.1497726>
- Stanovich, K. E. (2009). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory. In *Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond*, 55–88.
- Starcke, K., & Brand, M. (2012). Decision making under stress: A selective review. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *36*(4), 1228–1248.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. Brooks/Cole.
- Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *58*(Volume 58, 2007), 345–372. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145>

- Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). *Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness*. Penguin.
- Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. *Amsterdam Law Forum; HeinOnline: Online*, 89.
- Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, 840(2008), 99–128.
- Trout, J. D. (2002). Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding. *Philosophy of Science*, 69(2), 212–233.
- Upton, C. L. (2009). Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate. *The Journal of Ethics*, 13(2), 103–115. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9054-2>
- Vincent, D. (2022). The Application of Ethical Leadership - The Vincent S-CALM Model. *Sandhurst Occasional Paper*, 36.
- Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2001). *Managing the unexpected: Assuring high performance in an age of complexity* (pp. xvi, 200). Jossey-Bass.
- Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. (1998). The shadows and shallows of explanation. *Minds and Machines*, 8, 137–159.
- Wilson, T. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). Thinking too much: Introspection can reduce the quality of preferences and decisions. In *Attitudes: Their structure, function, and consequences* (pp. 299–317). Psychology Press.
- Woodward, J. (2005). *Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation*. Oxford university press.
- Zillmann, D. (2008). Excitation Transfer Theory. In *The International Encyclopedia of Communication* (1st ed.). Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405186407.wbiece049>